A New Voting Approach Based on False Candidates

Abstract:

In the last decades, social choice theory had a significant impact over social sciences, political sciences, and economic sciences. Recently, a new research area, computational social choice, which brings together social choice theory and computer science, gained an important popularity. An important topic in social choice theory is the theory of voting which has a lot of applications in computer science. In this paper we propose a new voting approach based on false candidates: first, we define a new type of voting scheme (i.e. the preferences of the voters over the set of candidates) called Q - voting scheme and then we propose variants for Borda Count, Condorcet and Black’s Rule voting methods that can be used for Q - voting schemes. We also introduce a formal approach and propose and prove three theorems related to the analyzed subject. In addition, we use Q - voting schemes for comparing three swarm intelligence algorithms; during the comparison process we apply an algorithm, also proposed in this paper, which automatically generates Q - voting schemes.
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