Abstract:

Unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) pose a great threat to many security sectors, including exposure to collisions – e.g. for airplanes, or through the possibility of remote observation – for critical infrastructure and entrepreneurs holding company secrets, e.g. state-of-the-art technology. Drones are already equipped with various sensors, such as high-resolution cameras, thermal imaging cameras, acoustic sensors or even contamination sensors, enabling data acquisition from a great distance and height, as well as by direct raid over an interesting target, without the physical exposure of the operator. Also, due to the ever lower prices of this type of commercial devices, the threat posed by them to enterprises is constantly growing. As a result, drone disruption devices are becoming more and more popular. They usually operate on the basis of introducing a disturbing signal to the receiving channel from GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System) or / and from a remote controller, i.e. most often in the form of noise or a modulated signal, which is to reduce the ratio of useful signal to noise and interfering signals (SINR). This is often done using directional antennas with high antenna gain. This is to prevent position estimation and / or cut-off from control by the operator, and consequently lead to landing or disabling the drone. However, it should be remembered that popular jamming devices will be able to disrupt the operation of commercial drones, dependent on GNSS systems and controlled mainly on the ISM (Industrial, Scientific, Medical) bands. Apart from the problems with the legality of the use of jammers, the neutralization of drones operating outside the ISM bands may be a big problem. It is not difficult to imagine a situation when a person who wants to invade the premises of the company with an unmanned aerial vehicle to effectively collect information, uses a redesigned drone for this purpose, which uses other frequencies, insensitive to conventional jammers.