Economic Boycotts and WTO Law

Abstract:

The paper evaluates whether the motivation of national security is a reasonable excuse to restrict free trade and furthermore – assuming arguendo a good faith bona fide threat exists – whether boycotts even constitute effective tools to advance national security. Countries have their legal arguments that they can use to justify the boycott or to invalidate it. The use of the national security exception in international economic law must be evaluated on the bottom-line question of effectiveness. The boycott has always proven ineffective and is now increasingly counter-productive due to transformative regional and global developments. Free trade and efficient markets combined with the ability of talented individuals to work without discrimination and restriction are the hallmarks of vibrant economies and stability – true national security. While the establishment of the boycott may at one time serve a perceived national security goal, there is no longer such a need. Economic boycotts undermine the WTO's commitment to free trade and prosperity which ultimately harms all parties and their national security and harms the greater global interest in international stability for all parties.