Abstract:

In the case of cooperation of many entities, smaller entities are at risk of being dominated by larger entities. To avoid this, when selecting decision-makers establishing the rules of this cooperation, the rule of degressive proportionality can be applied. Equal allocation favors the agents with small claims, proportional allocation is more favorable for the agents with larger claims, whereas degressive proportionality is supposed to be a compromise between these two apportionments. A classic example of such allocation is apportionment of mandates in the European Parliament among individual member states of the European Union. This article examined the proportions between equal and proportional allocation in consecutive terms of the EP, using the Loosemore-Hanby index and related Schutz index. The properties of Loosemore-Hanby index were also described to indicate that this disproportionality index can also be considered a measure of inequality in respect of each of two analyzed allocations separately.