Abstract:

The problem of new approaching in mining rents is to select policies for the contractual duty to provide sufficient incentives for foreign companies engaged in exploration and extraction of resources, by obtaining the broadest possible part of that resource rent.

Therefore, the present analysis is intended to present and evaluate a variety of different systems of contractual taxation usually used in developing countries. The idea is to determine this variety in different economic and geological conditions; of particular interest are the geological conditions that allow a low probability to discover new resources. The hypothesis was that, although current rates that are fixed in any given schema are designed to be sensitive to basic conditions, some regularity should appear in effectiveness of the schemes themselves.

As in the economic management of natural resources, the social importance of analyzing resources misuse is based on the social opportunity cost and the total economic value, the analysis of both concepts is extended in this paper, along with revealing, in the end, of the types and sources of inefficiency of resource management, hence the market and government failures in this respect.