Abstract:

The article discusses the theoretical and legal and philosophical foundations of determining free will in a situation where a person commits an act prohibited by criminal law in complicity. It is noted that in terms of the types of accomplices, we can talk about dichotomous division: insofar as the person retains free will, he remains the perpetrator of the crime, and having an effect on his will is an instigator. With the elimination of free will, the place of the performer is taken by the one who eliminated this free will or who used it. The author points out that if, when projecting free will in typical examples of this projection, an act that is not characterized by free will “takes” it from the past, then it is not free will that is borrowed, but the act with its free will as a whole. It is concluded that criminal liability and punishment are applicable only on the condition that the crime has become a product of human free will.