Abstract:

In this article we have started from the need of gathering and correlating the literature regarding the political control of the bureaucracy and the central bank literature. Looking at the political control of the bureaucracy literature we can identify the core of the agent – principal theory, the control and the responsiveness of the bureaucracies to political arena as a way of gaining democratic accountability and responsibility, limiting and reducing the inefficiencies and mismanagement of the bureaucracies. Consequently, the central bank literature focuses on some aspects as: bureaucratic insulation for an effective monetary policy, the need for central bank independence in order to increase the monetary policy credibility and an increase degree of informational transparency. Analyzing these two aspects of the two side of literature we can identify the lack of bureaucratic independence and the inefficiencies and mismanagement created by the responsiveness of bureaucrats to politicians. In this article we provide an overview of the bureaucracy applied to a crucial institution as the central bank is highlighting some important aspects as: the rational of the bureaucracy, the types of bureaucracy, importance of central bank independence. Finally, we consider that as insulation of the central banks from the political cycle, will be efficient in controlling inflation and stabilizing the economic actors expectations.